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RULE 24(A) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT: WHY
THE FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD REQUIRE
STANDING TO INTERVENE
I. INTRODUCTION
"'Lawsuit mania'.., a continual craving to go to law
against others, while considering themselves the injured
party. )
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to promote
speed and efficiency in the administration and just resolution of ac-
tions before the federal courts.2 Flexible standards for party joinder
and consolidation of claims aid the courts in disposing of disputes in
their entirety, thereby preventing subsequent reactive claims and du-
plicitous litigation. Although a liberal joinder policy and a broad in-
terpretation of the Federal Rules may conserve judicial resources un-
der a traditional model of litigation, the proliferation of public law
litigation3 and the increasingly complex nature of judicial proceed-
ings bring other considerations into play.
Lawsuits are no longer merely "vehicle[s] for settling disputes
between private parties about private rights." 4 Instead, the federal
1. CESARE LOMBROSO, THE MAN OF GENIUS, pt. III, ch. 3 (1891).
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
3. The label "public law litigation" refers to those cases in which the fed-
eral courts are called upon to vindicate public policy and legislative decision-
making rather than the private interests of private individuals according to the
dictates of private law. See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term,
Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4
(1982) [hereinafter 1981 Supreme Court Foreword]. Many scholars date the
emergence of public law litigation to the school desegregation efforts of the
mid-1950s and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See id. at
5; see also Brian Hutchings, Waiting for Divine Intervention: The Fifth Circuit
Tries to Give Meaning to Intervention Rules in Sierra Club v. City of San An-
tonio, 43 VILL. L. REv 693, 693 (1998).
4. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976) (citing M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER 251-52 (1933)).
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courts now function as a forum for challenging social and economic
public policy and legislative decision-making. 5 As the public law
litigation model has embedded itself into our "legal consciousness,"
6
the legislative branch has created additional statutory rights and
remedies for protecting social interests.7 The result, to use Cesare
Lombroso's term, is "lawsuit mania."
While the efficiency-driven Federal Rules may be helpful in or-
ganizing and disposing of some of this mania, the threat public law
litigation poses to the courts is twofold: 1) Once courts are called
upon to referee public policy and legislative decision-making, they
are inevitably dragged into the role as a super-legislature-"an af-
firmative, political" lawmaking body. This function is contrary to
our constitutional structure of government. 2) The additional number
of rights and remedies inherently increases the number of proceed-
ings brought in the federal court system, thereby increasing court
clog and congestion in an already overwhelmed system. In order to
curb these negative effects of public law litigation, the courts must
keep two questions constantly in mind when rendering standards for
the application of the Federal Rules: First, is the proposed interpreta-
tion of the procedural rule at issue constitutionally permissible? And
second, if all parties are allowed to raise all claims related to the sub-
ject matter, have we, in fact, created more or less complexity? In
other words, has the court gone too far in attempting to resolve all re-
lated disputes at once, so that the action itself is now more complex
and actually less efficient?9 The first question should ensure that any
5. See id. at 1284, 1288-1304. Professor Chayes's discussion on the
emergence of public law litigation is responsible for an entire body of legal
scholarship. Although some contest the legitimacy of this new phenomenon,
his writings have been crucial in addressing the need for judges to take a more
active role in this new model of litigation and reexamining the problems of
standing and interest representation arising out of these decisions because of
their widespread impact. See id. at 1310; see also Chayes, 1981 Supreme
Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 8-10; Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest
Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
279, 280 (1990).
6. Chayes, 1981 Supreme Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 8.
7. See Vreeland, supra note 5, at 280.
8. Chayes, 1981 Supreme Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 4.
9. See Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Re-
sources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701,
710-20 (1978). Brunet proposes that "input" from joinder mechanisms may
only enhance the judicial "output" in terms of efficiency and accuracy up to a
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application of the Federal Rules is within the constitutionally-
mandated framework of an Article III, Section 2 case or contro-
versy. 10 The second encourages judicial activism in defining and
limiting the scope of any matter to those parties and issues within the
federal courts' jurisdiction. Now more than ever, the courts must ex-
ercise caution in their quest for efficiency not to overlook the serious
constitutional concerns-specifically with regard to the Article III,
Section 2 requirement of standing.
The issue of whether Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules should re-
quire standing (particularly in public law litigation) implicates both
of the questions raised above. Because decisions in public law litiga-
tion cases are primarily concerned with prospective, policy-altering
relief, the outcome often has a widespread impact on significant
numbers of differently situated groups."1 This means that as lawsuits
are filed in the courts, many public interest groups or outside parties
rush in to ensure that any decision reached will be tailored with their
values and concerns in mind. Absent a requirement of standing,
Rule 24(a) is a convenient mechanism for these parties to assert their
claims in existing litigation where it would otherwise be constitu-
tionally impermissible because of the jurisdictional limitations
placed on the federal courts.
Furthermore, because these parties are asserting interests that are
not otherwise represented in the existing action, 12 the parties only
add to the number of issues and complexity of the litigation, thereby
defeating a large degree of the efficiency gained. For these reasons,
among others, this Note argues that the courts should adopt a thresh-
old requirement of standing, not only for the primary parties
certain point. Once this optimal point is reached, additional joinder (or input)
reduces the quality of the litigation and increases the chance of erroneous
judgment. See id.
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The federal courts may only exercise jurisdic-
tion over disputes which present a live "case" or "controversy." See Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
11. See Chayes, supra note 4, at 1310.
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (allowing intervention only when an appli-
cant has met the specified criteria "unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties." (emphasis added)).
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initiating the lawsuit, but for parties seeking Intervention as of Right
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section II of this Note addresses the constitutional requirements
of standing and the effect public law litigation has played on this
doctrine. Section III provides a brief history of Rule 24 and an over-
view of modem judicial interpretation of intervention standards by
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. Finally, Section IV ar-
ticulates specific arguments in favor of adopting a standing require-
ment for intervention and suggests alternative remedies for those par-
ties unable to seek adjudication of their issues in the federal courts.
II. ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 CASES AND CONTROVERSIES:
THE STANDING DOCTRINE
Standing is not merely a convenient tool to alleviate some of the
rush of lawsuit mania. It is, in fact, a constitutionally-mandated re-
quirement to ensure the federal courts are restricted in their exercise
of jurisdiction to actual "cases" or "controversies." 13  These two
words serve as a limitation on the federal judiciary and define its role
"in [the] tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts
will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of gov-
emment."'14 Standing, as one element of the doctrine of justiciabil-
ity, 15 is therefore a cornerstone in the system of checks and balances
which comprise our federal government.
Generally speaking, standing requires that a party assert an in-
jury in fact resulting from some illegal action on the part of the de-
fendant; that such injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the
named defendant(s); and that the injury is likely to be redressable by
the court. 16 The Supreme Court has also stressed that a party must be
13. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 94 (stating "[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts
is defined and limited by Article III of the Constitution... the judicial power
of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to 'cases' and 'controversies."').
14. Id. at 95.
15. Justiciability is a term of art used to express the limitations placed on
the courts by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. As the Court in Flast v.
Cohen stated, "no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek
adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are asking for an ad-
visory opinion, when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by
subsequent developments, and when there is no standing to maintain the ac-
tion." Id. (citations omitted).
16. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted).
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asserting their own rights.' 7 Unlike other aspects of justiciability-
such as the prohibitions on mootness, advisory opinions or political
questions-standing focuses on the status of the party rather than on
the issues presented. 18 Therefore, the emphasis for standing is on the
relationship between the plaintiff and the injury alleged.
Under the traditional litigation model, in order to demonstrate
standing, a plaintiff must simply show that he or she may be entitled
to some relief from a particular defendant. 19 It follows then, that in
cases between private parties about private rights, standing is largely
a function of whether a stated cause of action exists on the merits.
20
In public law litigation, however, it is often the case that no specific
cause of action has been granted to a group or individual party alleg-
ing injury. In such circumstances, the court will look to the nature of
the claim to determine whether it is a concrete, particularized griev-
ance that the court is capable of remedying. As stated by the Su-
preme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton:
2 1
Where the party does not rely on any specific statute au-
thorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of
standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a
"personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," as to
ensure that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution."
22
In public law litigation, parties often assert too generalized a
grievance for a court to conclude that a particular individual or group
has any "personal stake" in the outcome beyond that of the public in-
terest in the administration of law.23 Where a party's alleged injury
is a generalized grievance equivalent to the public interest, the Court
17. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
18. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 99.
19. See Chayes, 1981 Supreme Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 8-9.
20. See id.
21. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
22. Id. at 732 (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)
(holding that the vindication of the public interest cannot be converted into an
individual right sufficient to confer standing).
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has held the proper method of vindication to be the function of Con-
gress and the President and has denied standing to sue.
24
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court gave in to pressures to break
from the traditional model of litigation that barred purely public, citi-
zen or taxpayer suits,25 and relaxed the doctrinal limits of standing.
Originally, courts required that a plaintiff allege an injury to a preex-
isting legal interest. 26 However, the Court abandoned this "legal in-
terest" test in favor of a more lenient "zones of interests" or "injury
in fact" standard. 27 Furthermore, the Court "extended legal recogni-
tion to a wide array of interests beyond the traditional common law
protections of person and property."28 In total, this doctrinal shift
greatly expanded the scope of standing to sue and gave way to an
even greater flood of public law litigation claims. 29 In a series of
cases throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court extended
standing to citizens challenging unfavorable apportionment of voting
districts, 30 taxpayers challenging the financing of religious schools
with federal funds,31 and special interest groups, such as the subsi-
dized farmers, challenging the validity of amendments made to the
Food and Agriculture Act of 1965.32
In the early 1970s, the Burger Court reigned in the rapid expan-
sion of public law litigation cases and reaffirmed the doctrinal limita-
tions of standing.33 In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against federal officials from issuing
permits for commercial exploitation of a national game refuge
24. See id.
25. See Chayes, 1981 Supreme Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 10-11.
26. See id. at 10.
27. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1970); Ass'n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also Chayes,
1981 Supreme Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 14-16 (discussing the effects
of the Barlow and Camp decisions).
28. Chayes, 1981 Supreme Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 10.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-08 (1962).
31. See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 106. This case remains the only grant of
standing to taxpayers seeking to redress alleged harms arising from federal
statutory distribution of resources. Cf Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479 (distin-
guishing Flast on the ground that the taxpayers in that case asserted standing
pursuant to Congress's exercise of its Article I, Section 8 power to tax and
spend).
32. See Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164.
33. See Chayes, 1981 Supreme Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 11.
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adjacent to Sequoia National Park.34 The group claimed to have
standing under the judicial-review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act,35 based on a "special interest in the conservation and
sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of
the country.... 36 Rejecting this argument, the Court specified that
an "injury in fact" requires the claimant to be among the injured and
not just asserting "a mere interest in the problem." 37 Furthermore,
the Court cautioned against permitting special interest groups to as-
sert claims in which they had no more interest than the general pub-
lic.
38
Two years later, in United States v. Richardson39 and
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,4 ° the Court
closed the door on the idea that its earlier decisions might support
taxpayer or citizen suits. In each of these cases, the Court held the
generalized grievances of citizens or taxpayers without more of an
interest were insufficient to confer standing.41
Since Sierra Club, the Court has recommitted itself to upholding
the doctrine of standing and the constitutional limitations placed
upon the federal courts by Article III. In 1981, the Americans United
for Separation of Church and State attempted to challenge the dis-
posal of surplus Army property to the Valley Forge Christian College
as a violation of the Establishment Clause, raising a theory of tax-
payer standing A la Flast v. Cohen.42 The Court, however, placed the
final nail in the coffin for taxpayer standing, limiting Flast to grant
standing only under the specific circumstances of that case-an Es-
tablishment Clause challenge to an exercise by Congress pursuant to
its Article I, Section 8 power to tax and spend.43 The Court held that
the standing conferred on taxpayers challenging expenditures in vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause would not support standing for
taxpayers challenging a disposition of property in violation of the
34. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 730.
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2000).
36. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 730.
37. Id. at 734-35, 739.
38. See id. at 739-40.
39. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
40. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
41. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217 n.7, Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176-78.
42. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 469.
43. See id. at 479.
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Establishment Clause. 44 Although Valley Forge might seem to be an
instance of the Court splitting hairs, the intended outcome of rein-
vigorating the standing doctrine was accomplished. Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist summarized the importance of standing,
stating:
Article III... is not merely a troublesome hurdle to be
overcome if possible so as to reach the 'merits' of a lawsuit
which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the
basic charter promulgated by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion at Philadelphia in 1787, a charter which created a gen-
eral government, provided for the interaction between that
government and the governments of the several States, and
was later amended so as to either enhance or limit its au-
thority with respect to both States and individuals.
45
This summary sends a clear message to the lower courts that
they should be especially mindful when evaluating the standing of
parties bringing grievances before them. It would seem, then, a logi-
cal extension that the courts should be concerned with the standing
of all parties-whether they originally filed the suit or are merely
seeking to intervene in order to have a court consider their interests
in addition to those asserted in the complaint.
III. RULE 24(A): INTERVENTION OF RIGHT
Rule 24(a) allows parties outside an action to intervene upon
timely application if such a right is either unconditionally conferred
by statute46 or if the party can demonstrate: 1) an interest relating to
the subject of the action; 2) that such interest will be impaired or im-
peded by the disposition of the action; and 3) that the intervening
party's interests are not sufficiently represented by existing parties.
47
Although the Supreme Court has, on several occasions, addressed the
issue of what constitutes an "interest" in the action,48 the Court has
44. See id.
45. Id. at 476.
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). Although intervention pursuant to Rule
24(a)(1) is an equally important method for party joinder, the scope of this
Note is limited to a discussion of intervention pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2).
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
48. See Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 415, 432-34
for a discussion on the Supreme Court's various ad hoc attempts to articulate
an interest standard. Compare Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531
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repeatedly side-stepped the question of whether a party must demon-
strate standing in order to allow intervention. 49 For the most part,
this determination has been left for the lower federal courts to re-
solve.5 °
A. A Brief History of Rule 24
While the scope of this Note is limited to the modem application
of Rule 24, the history of the Rule prior to its 1966 amendment, may
be helpful in understanding the impact of public law litigation on the
jurisprudence of intervention. Furthermore, the development of the
rule into its modem form may explain why a few circuits continue to
allow intervention without the otherwise seemingly-mandatory re-
quirement of standing.
Prior to 1966, Rule 24(a)(2) allowed intervention when an appli-
cant's interests were inadequately represented and that applicant
could demonstrate they would be bound by any judgment rendered.5'
Although some courts only required a showing of potential prejudice
if the litigation were to proceed in the party's absence, the majority
strictly interpreted Rule 24 only to allow intervention when a party
would be bound due to the effects of res judicata.52 An additional
provision provided that intervention would also be proper for those
adversely affected by the distribution or disposition of property
(1971) (narrowly holding that "[w]hat is obviously meant there is a signifi-
cantly protectable interest."), with Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natu-
ral Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133-36 (1967) (allowing for a broad interpretation
of "'interest' in the 'transaction which is the subject of the action"').
49. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1985) (stating "[w]e
need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before a district
court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the re-
quirements of Art. III.").
50. See discussion infra Parts I.B-C.
51. See Tobias, supra note 48, at 428.
52. See id. at 428-29 (citing Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 304
F.2d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1962)). Under the doctrine of res judicata, "a final
judgment issued by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the
parties in any subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action."
MILTON D. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 227 (2d ed. 1979). Only parties
actually joined and subjected to the jurisdiction of the court are bound by a
judgment. Mere knowledge of, and opportunity to intervene in, a lawsuit that
may adversely impact the interests of potential intervening parties is not suffi-
cient to bind or preclude them from litigating their interests in the future. See
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989).
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within the court's control.53 This early form of the Rule reflected a
narrow approach to intervention, consistent with the nature of the
traditional litigation model.
As discussed earlier in this Note, in private disputes between
private parties, the question of whether an interest is sufficient to
confer standing is virtually non-existent. 54 A plaintiff or intervening
party establishes standing simply by demonstrating a legitimate
cause of action on the merits. 55 Therefore, under the old rule, if an
intervening party was so situated as to be adversely affected by the
disposition of the action, or bound by the res judicata effects of a
judgment, the party simultaneously met the requirements of Rule 24
interest and Article III standing. While it might be argued the former
rule and its narrow construction followed a more constitutionally-
sound approach with regard to standing, other contradictions within
the Rule's operation created serious doubts about the adequacy of its
application, especially in the context of public law litigation, and
paved the way for the 1966 amendments.
56
The fundamental problem with the old Rule 24 arose from the
simultaneous requirements in section (a)(2) that a potential interven-
ing party had to demonstrate their interests were not adequately rep-
resented, while at the same time demonstrating that res judicata
57would limit their substantive rights in future litigation. However, a
strict reading of the doctrine of res judicata dictates that a party's in-
terests must be adequately represented in an earlier suit to be bound,
and therefore precluded from re-litigation in a later action.
58
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(3) (1938) (amended 1966).
54. See discussion supra Part II; see also Chayes, 1981 Supreme Court
Foreword, supra note 3, at 8.
55. See Chayes, 1981 Supreme Court Foreword, supra note 3, at 9.
56. See David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,
Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 757 (1968); see also Erik
Figlio, Stacking the Deck Against "Purely Economic Interests ": Inequity and
Intervention in Environmental Litigation, 35 GA. L. REV. 1219, 1226 (2001).
57. See Figlio, supra note 56, at 1226.
58. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). Although Hansberry
dealt with the binding effects of res judicata in Rule 23 class actions, it stands
for the overall premise that parties not adequately represented in an action can-
not be bound by a judgment in their absence. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 (1982) (providing that nonparties may only be
bound if "represented" by a party who is:
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Furthermore, the courts concluded that where a party's interest might
only be bound insofar as it coincided with the public interest, res ju-
dicata did not apply and, accordingly, intervention was not warranted
under Rule 24(a).59 In short, under the narrow construction of old
Rule 24(a)(2), a party could only intervene if they could prove their
interests were not adequately represented for the purpose of interven-
tion while proving their interests were adequately represented for the
purpose of res judicata so that they would be bound by any judgment
in their absence. This catch-22 functioned "as a virtual bar on inter-
vention of right.",
60
In 1961, the apparent catch-22 was reinforced and further com-
plicated by the Supreme Court's Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United
States61 decision, which all but destroyed the original purpose of old
Rule 24.62 The case arose from an antitrust action by the government
against the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP), alleging restraint of trade and restraint of competition
among the Society's members. 63 The resulting consent decree con-
tained, among other things, "requirements for Board elections by
membership vote and for revenue distributions... on a weighted ba-
sis relative to the particular member's contribution to the revenue-
producing value of all members' contribution to the Society's
(a) the trustee of an estate or interest of which the person is a benefici-
ary; or (b) invested by the person with authority to represent him in an
action; or (c) the executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or
similar fiduciary manager of an interest of which the person is a bene-
ficiary; or (d) an official or agency invested by law with authority to
represent the person's interests; or (e) the representative of a class of
persons similarly situated, designated as such with the approval of the
court, of which the person is a member).
59. See, e.g., Sam Fox Publ'g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689
(1961) ("We regard it as fully settled that a person whose private interests co-
incide with the public interest.., is nonetheless not bound by the eventuality
of such litigation, and hence may not, as of right, intervene in it.").
60. Figlio, supra note 56, at 1226.
61. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
62. Although the operational catch-22 only functioned to prevent interven-
tion under Rule 24(a)(2), the extremely limited instances whereby a party
might intervene under (a)(l)-if conferred by statute, or (a)(3)-when a party
would be adversely affected by distribution or disposition of property-left
very little, if any, substance to the rule.
63. See Sam Fox Publ'g Co., 366 U.S. at 685-86.
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catalogue, all as determined by the Board of Directors." 64 In a sub-
sequent action for court approval of modifications to the consent de-
cree, a few of the less influential members of ASCAP sought to in-
tervene. The intervention was denied by the district court and the
issue was appealed to the Supreme Court.
The intervenors argued the consent decree had the effect of a
class judgment, and that, while they were bound by its terms because
they were members of ASCAP, their interests were not adequately
represented by the government in ameliorating their position or
breaking up the control of ASCAP held by the larger publishers.
65
Recognizing the appellants would be bound as members of ASCAP,
the Court allowed that adequacy of representation against the gov-
ernment as to the antitrust claims was sufficient, while the appel-
lants' interests as against ASCAP did not allow for intervention be-
cause their interests would not be bound in the strictest sense of res
judicata.
66
Although it might be argued that under Sam Fox the strict res
judicata requirement was properly limited to cases only in which in-
tervenors claimed to be bound as an effective class action, 67 the plain
language of the rule was not limited as such. This may have been the
motivating factor for the drafters to drop the res judicata language in
the 1966 amendments. Unfortunately, as the split in the courts over
the interest requirement reveals, the intent of the Advisory Commit-
tee "remains unclear and controversial. 68
In light of the extensive expansion of public law litigation
around the time of the amendment, it is important to note that the
primary effect of the courts' strict interpretation of Rule 24(a)(2) was
to bar public interest litigants and those potential parties who lacked
standing from intervening. From this perspective, there is a strong
argument that the 1966 amendment was merely an attempt to remedy
the catch-22 of the former rule while, at the same time, maintaining
the courts' earlier stringent interest requirement which limited
64. Id. at 686.
65. See id. at 688-89.
66. See id. at 693.
67. See Tobias, supra note 48, at 429 (arguing the Sam Fox decision merely
"rendered paragraph (a)(2) a nullity in class actions.").
68. Id.
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intervention to those parties who could also demonstrate standing.
69
On this point, draftsman of the 1966 amendment, Professor Benja-
min Kaplan wrote:
The changed wording of the rule was intended (besides
overcoming Sam Fox) to drive beyond the narrow notion of
an interest in specific property. But the interest spoken of
in the new rule finds its own limits in the historic continuity
of the subject of intervention and in the concepts of new
rule 19, to which intervention looks for analogy.
70
This suggestion that the Rule 24 interest requirement should
take its meaning from Rule 19 supports a stricter, almost pre-1966
amendment interpretation-one that implicitly includes standing.
71
Accordingly, many courts "have said that the amendment does not
69. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 56, at 757-58. In an article written only
two years after the amendment, Professor David Shapiro argues Rule 24(a)
should extend a right to intervene only to those parties who should be joined
under Rule 19 and to class members who can demonstrate their interests are
not adequately represented by the class representative in a pending action. His
view is premised on the virtually identical language of the amended rule and
that of Rule 19(a)(ii). While his argument is not directed toward the issue of
standing, it follows that if a party is deemed necessary under Rule 19, their in-
terest is sufficient to meet standing requirements. Shapiro suggests other hope-
ful intervenors should petition under Rule 24(b) as a matter of discretion left to
the judge.
70. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV.
356, 405 (1967); see also 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1908 (2d ed. 1986).
71. Rule 19(a)(2)(i) mandates joinder of parties necessary to an action when
a "person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situ-
ated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a prac-
tical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest." FED.
R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i). Under Rule 19, courts are far less likely to find parties
are necessary parties to an action. See, e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., Ltd.,
498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990) (holding joint tortfeasors are never necessary parties).
Furthermore, courts tend to be even more hesitant in the public law litigation
context "on the theory that a 'public interest litigant' must have a forum in
which to contest governmental activity and vindicate public rights even though
some non-parties might be affected as a result." RICHARD L. MARCUS &
EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 52 n.6 (3d ed. 1998). Therefore, if courts are to
look to Rule 19 for guidance in determining whether a party seeking interven-
tion meets the interest requirement of Rule 24, intervention should only be al-
lowed in the most narrow of circumstances and almost never in public law liti-
gation.
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expand the types of interest that will satisfy the [modem] rule." 72 On
the other hand, many courts and commentators have interpreted the
1966 amendment as an intentional departure from a narrow interest
requirement. 73 The following two subsections address this modem
split in interpretation.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Modern Rule 24(a)
"Interest" Requirement
It would be incorrect to say the Supreme Court has not yet de-
fined a standard of interest under Rule 24(a) Intervention of Right.
On the contrary, the Court has many times articulated some level of
interest a party must demonstrate in order to successfully intervene.
74
Unfortunately, these decisions have ranged from the very broad to
the very narrow in defining interest-contradicting one another, and
all but disregarding the issue of standing.
In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. ,75 the
Court made its first attempt at interpreting the newly amended Rule
24 in a public law litigation context. The United States originally
brought its case against El Paso Natural Gas Company for alleged
violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in connection with its ac-
quisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation. 76 The Supreme
Court remanded the case and directed the district court to order El
Paso to divest itself of Pacific Northwest "without delay. 77  The
State of California, Southern California Edison, and Cascade Natural
Gas all sought intervention in the divestiture proceedings under the
old Rule 24(a) and all were unsuccessful.78 On appeal, the Court
72. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 70.
73. See Cascade, 386 U.S. at 134 (reading the Advisory Committee note to
inject elasticity into the interest requirement of Rule 24).
74. See id. at 135-36 (holding Rule 24(a) is broad enough to allow parties
with an economic interest to intervene); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71
(1985) (requiring standing to intervene on appeal when existing parties have
abandoned further appeals); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531
(1971) (requiring a significantly protectable interest to intervene).
75. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
76. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
77. Id. at 662.
78. It is important to note that while these parties sought intervention in or-
der to protect a specific, personal interest, the parties were not protecting a le-
gally cognizable interest or seeking redress for an actual harm. See id. In-
stead, the parties wanted to effect a favorable outcome in the divestiture
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allowed that California and Southern California Edison were both
parties "'adversely affected' within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(3)
' 79
despite their lack of interest in the property and allowed for their in-
tervention under the old standard.
Cascade's interest, however, was based solely on Pacific North-
west's future ability to perform. The Court cited the Advisory
Committee notes of 1966 as injecting elasticity into the rule and al-
lowed Cascade to intervene on an extremely broad reading of the
amended rule.80 Ironically, the factors implicating Cascade's interest
were argued to provide "standing to intervene," 81 although the Court
never addressed whether Cascade had established standing or
whether it was required.
In his dissent, Justice Stewart recognized some of the most prob-
lematic aspects of allowing an overly-flexible standard of interven-
tion in the public law litigation context, commenting:
Formulation of effective and consistent government... pol-
icy is unlikely to result from "piecemeal intervention of a
multitude of individual complaintants" .... Today the
Court ignores all this and grants intervention of right to any
volunteer claiming to speak for the public interest whenever
he can convince a court that the Government might have
used bad judgment in conducting or settling a lawsuit. I
think this decision, which undermines the Justice Depart-
ment in the discharge of its responsibilities, and invites ob-
struction and delay in the course of public litigation, is un-
supported by the provision of old Rule 24, new Rule 24, or
any other conceivably tolerable standard governing inter-
vention as of right.82
This scathing critique of the Court's decision illustrates two key
elements in the standing debate. First, Stewart asserts that allowing
intervention of the masses who might wish to challenge government
action undermines the function of government.83 Although Justice
proceedings by influencing the Court's public policy decisions. For this rea-
son, I categorize this suit as a public law litigation matter.
79. Cascade, 386 U.S. at 135.
80. See id. at 134-35.
81. Id. at 133.
82. Id. at 158-59 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
83. See id.
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Stewart does not go so far, an argument can be made that the democ-
ratic process is the appropriate remedy for situations where the
"[g]overnment might have used bad judgment" 84 but has not caused
an actual, redressable harm sufficient to confer standing. Second,
Stewart attacks the presumed judicial efficiency of allowing flexible
intervention.8 5 His belief that inviting individuals to speak on behalf
of the public interest creates delay and obstruction will be discussed
later in this Note.
8 6
Three years later in Donaldson v. United States,87 the Court nar-
rowed the interest requirement to a "significantly protectable inter-
est." 88 In this case, Donaldson sought to intervene pursuant to Rule
24(a)(2) in enforcement proceedings instituted by the Internal Reve-
nue Service, ordering the production of records from his former em-
ployer, Acme, and Acme's account regarding his employment.89 The
Court was not persuaded by the argument that their decision in Reis-
man v. Caplin90 stood for the proposition that "a taxpayer may inter-
vene as of right simply because it is tax liability that is the subject of
the [proceeding]." 9' The Court determined that a taxpayer has no
proprietary interest in business records which are not afforded privi-
lege and therefore, the taxpayer's interest does not amount to a sig-
nificantly protectable interest and is not sufficient to allow interven-
tion.92 Expressing concerns similar to those of Justice Stewart in his
Cascade dissent, the majority in Donaldson noted that to allow inter-
vention without a greater interest "would unwarrently cast doubt
upon and stultify the Service's every investigatory move."
93
Despite the establishment of this seemingly-narrow "signifi-
cantly protectable interest" standard, and its cautioning against inter-
vention which might unnecessarily interfere with the functioning of
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
88. Id. at 531.
89. See id. at 519-20.
90. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
91. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 530.
92. See id. at 530-3 1.
93. Id. at531.
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government, the Court has failed to provide any further guidance-
most notably lacking in the question of standing.
94
Following the Donaldson decision, there have been relatively
few attempts by the Supreme Court to clearly define the requirement
of interest. In Trbovich v. United Mine Workers,95 the Court seemed
to suggest standing might not be required for intervention, but refo-
cused its Rule 24(a) analysis on the issue of inadequacy of represen-
tation.96 However, despite the suggestion of a requirement of interest
less than standing, the Court allowed only limited intervention in the
case,97 arguably restricting its decision to the "facts and peculiar
statutory scheme involved."98 In a footnote to its later Diamond v.
Charles" decision, the Court acknowledged the emergence of a cir-
cuit split on the standing issue but again failed to resolve the incon-
sistency among the lower federal courts.1
00
Diamond did, however, establish that "an intervenor's right to
continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention
was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he
fulfills the requirements of Article III." 'I01 In other words, an inter-
vening party must demonstrate standing in order to continue the case
once the original Article III party has abandoned appeals. As dis-
cussed later in this Note, this black letter rule remains one of the
strongest arguments in favor of standing to intervene. To allow
94. See Vreeland, supra note 5, at 285.
95. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
96. See id. at 538; see also Tobias, supra note 48, at 433 (discussing the
scope of the Trbovich decision).
97. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539.
98. Tobias, supra note 48, at 433. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of
the Supreme Court decisions addressing the Rule 24(a) interest requirement is
their fact-bound nature. While precedent certainly exists, the application of
these decisions is severely limited to narrow situations and provides minimal
guidance to the lower federal courts. See id. at 432.
99. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
100. See id. at 68-69 n.21. After noting the problem, the Court dismissed the
issue, stating "[w]e need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene
before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2),
but also the requirements of Art. Ill." Id. at 68-69; see also Hutchings, supra
note 3, at 713 (discussing the Court's recognition and refusal to resolve the is-
sue); Tobias, supra note 48, at 434 (same).
101. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 (citing Mine Workers v. Eagle-Picher Mining
& Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 338 (1945), and Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S.
352, 368 (1980)).
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otherwise permits intervening parties into an action without an op-
portunity to appeal the decision to which they are bound according to
the dictates of res judicata unless the original party (who does not
represent identical interests) is compelled to pursue appeals related to
his own interests.
In sum, the Supreme Court has declined to provide any kind of
decisive answer to the question of whether Rule 24(a) Intervention of
Right requires standing. While it must be recognized that leaving the
interest requirement ambiguous allows for more flexibility and a
case-by-case determination of whether an applicant's intervention
promotes efficiency, the outcome has become a "confused body of
case law in the circuit courts."' 0 2 Accordingly, this Note now turns
its attention to the lower federal courts treatment of the issue.
C. The Interest Requirement and the Lower Federal Courts
In their struggle to articulate a standard for Rule 24(a)(2), circuit
and district court judges have not exactly split down a clear line of
those who require standing and those who do not. Instead, the dif-
ferent interpretations may, at best, be described as a spectrum,'
0 3
ranging from a very flexible, open-ended interest standard to a strin-
gent interest requiring something "greater than the interest sufficient
to satisfy the standing requirement."'' 0 4 In fact, one professor has
calculated the number of formulations to be somewhere near a half-
dozen and further research indicates that figure may be low.1
0 5
While the concept of intervention would seem to inherently in-
voke the constitutional question of standing-as both set minimum
standards for parties seeking adjudication of their interests-the vast
majority of lower federal court judges do not mention standing in
their rulings on intervention.10 6 This statement should not be con-
strued to imply the vast majority do not require standing. On the
contrary, the trend in the lower courts seems to be in favor of the use
of standing as an important, if not required, factor in granting
102. Vreeland, supra note 5, at 287.
103. See Hutchings, supra note 3, at 715; see also Tobias, supra note 48, at
434.
104. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir.
1985).
105. See Tobias, supra note 48, at 434-35.
106. See id.
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intervention or denying applicants who appear to be "intermeddlers
or [who have] asserted interests.., considered intangible, tenuous or
indirectly related to the litigation's subject matter .... ,, It is more
likely that standing is often not mentioned because it is simply never
raised as an issue. As discussed earlier, under the traditional litiga-
tion model, intervening parties generally meet the requirements of
Rule 24(a)(2) and Article III standing simultaneously. Only when an
applicant is truly peripheral or outside the action10 8 is standing even
an issue the court might need to address.
10 9
Of the courts that have addressed the issue, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits, as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, require standing to intervene. The Eleventh
Circuit remains on the fence--explicitly declining to require standing
in the proper sense, while at the same time refusing to allow an inter-
vention if a potential litigant is merely seeking to represent a general-
ized grievance. Rounding out the spectrum, the Second, Sixth and
Ninth Circuits utilize a more lenient approach and allow intervention
even when a party lacks standing.
1. Liberal intervention
On the most flexible end of the spectrum sits the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 10 The judges of this circuit
107. Id. at 440.
108. For example, public interest groups or other litigants seeking to affect
change in public policy who have not actually been harmed or who do not have
a redressable cause of action are peripheral.
109. It is interesting to note that the largest number of cases involving inter-
vention applications of public interest groups have been heard by the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits, yet these circuits sit on opposite ends of the spectrum with
regard to standing. See Vreeland, supra note 5, at 288.
110. See Hutchings, supra note 3, at 715 (citing Tobias, supra note 48, at
435). Each of these authorities would also include the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia as belonging under the classification of a
broad interpretation. However, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
has since articulated a requirement of standing for all Rule 24(a) intervening
parties. See Build. and Const. Trades Dept, AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275,
1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that "because an intervenor participates on equal
footing with the original parties to a suit, a movant for leave to intervene under
Rule 24(a)(2) must satisfy the same Article III standing requirements as the
original parties."); see also City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
17 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam); S. Christian Leadership Confer-
ence v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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tend to regard the 1966 amendment of the Rule as expanding the
scope of intervention and rely on practical considerations of effi-
ciency in granting or denying intervention."' In all cases, "[t]he rule
is construed broadly in favor of applicants for tervenon.12
In Greene v. United States,' 13 the court stated that the determina-
tion of whether an applicant demonstrates a sufficient interest is a
"practical, threshold inquiry" 114 and that "[n]o specific legal or equi-
table interest need be established."' 15  This statement remains the
general rule for the Ninth Circuit. However, the Greene court did
note that a merely economic interest would not be sufficient regard-
less of how substantial.1"6
According to the Ninth Circuit's Sierra Club v. EPA1 7 decision,
in order to meet the Supreme Court's "significantly protectable inter-
est" requirement (from Donaldson), an intervenor must establish that
his or her "interest is protectable under some law"' 18 and that a "rela-
tionship [exists] between the legally-protected interest and the claims
at issue."" 9 Although the Ninth Circuit certainly remains the most
liberal and has declined to adopt a standing requirement, it might be
argued that the language of Sierra Club suggests the court must rec-
ognize some level of legally cognizable interest before granting in-
tervention-a suggestion closely paralleling the standing require-
ments of Article III.
Furthermore, it should be noted that even the Ninth Circuit con-
sistently demands a greater showing in the public law litigation con-
text. 120 In fact, intervention of public interest groups is only allowed
111. See Hutchings, supra note 3, at 715-16.
112. Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing
United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 587 (9th Cir. 1990)).
113. 996 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1993).
114. Id. at976.
115. Id.
116. See id. (citing Portland Audubon Soc. v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308-09
(9th Cir. 1989)).
117. 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993).
118. Id. at 1484.
119. Id.
120. Compare Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing
liberal intervention of the City of Phoenix to protect its interest in the admini-
stration of water quality permits under the Clean Water Act), with Northwest
Forest Res. v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying interven-
tion of a non-profit environmental organization claiming a "longstanding
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in cases where the "groups [are] directly involved in the enactment
of the law or in the administrative proceedings out of which the liti-
gation arose."'12' Therefore, a public interest or lobbying group
might only be permitted to intervene where they had an active role in
lobbying for the adoption of the statute at issue. This seeming desire
to curb unfettered intervention in public law litigation would be con-
sistent with an argument in favor of adopting a standing requirement
for intervention. The Ninth Circuit, however, declines to do so. 1
22
2. Standing not required
While the Ninth Circuit maintains a flexible interest require-
ment-sometimes invoking language similar to standing, sometimes
allowing for broad intervention with no mention of the issue123 -
other circuits have clearly articulated a standard for Rule 24(a) inter-
ests that specifically excludes any requirement of standing. 124 How-
ever, even among the circuits that do not require standing, there is a
spectrum of interpretation in the application of Rule 24.
The Second and Sixth Circuits, for example, do not require
standing and regard the issue as irrelevant to the Rule 24(a) in-
quiry. 125 In United States Postal Service v. Brennan,126 the National
Association of Letter Carriers sought to intervene in a suit by the
Postal Service to enjoin two private defendants from running a mail
delivery service. 127 The district court denied intervention for lack of
standing and granted the Postal Service's motion for summary judg-
ment. 128  Despite dismissal of the case, the Letter Carriers were
interest in the proper management and environmental protection of the public
forest lands . . ").
121. Northwest Forest Res., 82 F.3d at 837.
122. See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991).
123. Compare Sierra Club, 995 F.2d 1478 (requiring an interest related to
some law and a relationship between that law and the action), with United
States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d 509, 521 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating
"[a] party seeking to intervene pursuant to Rule 24, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, need not possess the standing necessary to initiate the lawsuit.").
124. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th
Cir. 1994); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989);
United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978).
125. See Perry, 16 F.3d at 690; Brennan, 579 F.2d at 190.
126. 579 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1978).
127. See id. at 190.
128. See id. at 190 n.1.
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allowed to appeal the decision denying them intervention because
defendants still had time remaining to petition for certiorari. 129 The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court, reaching their decision,
however, on different grounds. 130 The court went on to disagree with
the district court on the issue of standing. According to the Second
Circuit, once a case or controversy exists, there is "no need to impose
standing upon the proposed intervenor."
' 131
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors v. Perry,132 took the opportunity to assert a no-standing require-
ment for Rule 24 intervention. In the case, Associated Builders &
Contractors sought an injunction against the enforcement of a statute
requiring apprentice ratios for licensed electricians.' 33 The Michigan
Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA)
was permitted to permissively intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b). Af-
ter the district court granted the injunction, NECA sought to chal-
lenge the decision. The Sixth Circuit, however, dismissed the appeal
citing a lack of standing. 134 The court held that an intervening party
need not have standing to appeal where an existing party on whose
side intervention was sought possessed standing.' 35 However, be-
cause the original party to the action had not appealed the decision,
NECA was unable to maintain the litigation on its own.
136
In contrast to the Second and Sixth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit
does not require standing in a proper sense but does enforce the re-
quirement that an intervening party assert a particularized interest
rather than a general grievance. 137 As the court discussed in Chiles
129. See id. at 190.
130. See id. at 191 (holding the Letter Carriers should not be permitted to in-
tervene because of their failure to demonstrate inadequacy of representation).
It is interesting to note that the court cited Trbovich v. United Mine Workers,
404 U.S. 528 (1972) for the proposition that standing should not be required
for intervention. As discussed earlier in this Note, the Supreme Court has
clearly stated they have not resolved this issue in favor of or against a standing
requirement. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986).
131. Brennan, 579 F.2d at 190. The Second Circuit reaffirmed this position
in United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984).
132. 16 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 1994).
133. See id, at 689.
134. Seeid. at691.
135. See id. at 690.
136. See id. at 692 (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986)).
137. See Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1212-13 (citing Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d
956, 959 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
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v. Thornburgh, the Eleventh Circuit regards the standing cases as
relevant to define the type of interest that the intervenor must as-
sert. 1
38
3. Standing required
The Eighth Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia have most often denied Rule 24(a) applicants for their
failure to demonstrate standing. 139 It is the opinion of this author that
this approach represents the proper level of deference courts should
afford constitutional considerations when construing the Federal
Rules to maximize efficiency.
In Mausolfv. Babbitt,140 a group of snowmobilers sought an in-
junction against prohibitions on snowmobiling in Voyageurs Na-
tional Park. When a conservation group claiming an interest in the
enforcement of the provisions sought intervention, the district court
denied their motion, concluding the interests asserted were already
adequately represented by the defendant, Secretary of the Interior,
Bruce Babbitt. 141 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the
conservation groups' interests were not adequately represented.
142
However, in a lengthy discussion on the issue, the court held that
those without standing were not eligible to litigate in the courts of the
United States. 143 According to the Eighth Circuit, "an Article III
case or controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack standing,
is-put bluntly-no longer an Article III case or controversy."'
144
The District of Columbia is the most recent circuit to declare a
standing requirement for Rule 24 intervention. 145 In Building and
Construction Trades Department v. Reich,146 the court denied inter-
vention to the National Trade Association of Construction Employers
138. Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1212.
139. See, e.g., Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996); Bldg. &
Const. Trades Dep't v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
140. 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996).
141. See id. at 1297.
142. See id. at 1303-04.
143. See id. at 1300-04.
144. Id. at 1300.
145. See Reich, 40 F.3d at 1282. But see Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 709
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (allowing permissive intervention of a state banking commis-
sioner despite his acknowledged lack of standing).
146. 40 F.3d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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because they failed to show that their interests were inadequately
represented. 147 In setting forth the standard for the Rule 24(a)(2) in-
terest requirement, the court articulated that because "an intervenor
participates on equal footing with the original parties to a suit, a
movant ... must satisfy the same Article III standing requirements as
original parties."' 148 The presumption that an intervenor may partici-
pate as a fully-recognized party (unless permitted by the court to in-
tervene for a limited purpose) is universally recognized across the
circuits. However, this presumption is complicated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Diamond v. Charles149-- essentially prohibiting
intervenors without standing the opportunity to appeal. This issue
provides one of the strongest arguments in favor of requiring stand-
ing to intervene and will be discussed in further detail later in this
Note. 5
4. More than standing
The Seventh Circuit represents the most extreme standard for
would-be intervenors, going so far as to state that Rule 24(a) dictates
something more than the Article III "case" or "controversy" re-
quirements for standing.' 51 In United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land,
the United States instituted a condemnation action to acquire a 36.96
acre tract of the Indian Dunes National Lakeshore, known as Cres-
cent Dune, pursuant to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Act.' 
5 2
Four years into the action, the public interest/lobbying group, Save
the Dunes Council, moved to intervene, seeking legal protection for
the continued public use of the dunes. 153 The Council had lobbied
extensively for the national legislation protecting the dunes, and cited
its concern for the area as well as its "'members' personal aesthetic,
conservational and recreational interest in the property."' 154  Al-
though the Supreme Court left the door open for environmental and
aesthetic injuries in Sierra Club v. Morton,155 the Seventh Circuit
147. See id. at 1283.
148. Id. at 1282.
149. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
150. See infra Part IV.D.
151. See 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 859.
152. See id. at 857.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 859 (citing Appellant's brief).
155. 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
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was not persuaded that such an interest was sufficient to confer
standing and concluded "[t]he interest of a proposed intervenor...
must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing re-
quirement."1
56
Although the Seventh Circuit remains the most stringent on the
Rule 24(a) interest requirement, the 36.96 Acres of Land opinion
seems to be the high-watermark. Following Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,' 57 in which the Supreme Court declared a standing rule
against generalized grievances, the Seventh Circuit backed away
from a Rule 24(a) interest requirement greater than that of Article III
standing, except perhaps in purely "public law" cases.'
58
In conclusion, this broad spectrum of interpretation among the
lower courts with regard to the issue of standing and Rule 24 demon-
strates the need for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue. This
Note now turns its attention to the specific arguments in favor of
adopting some form of standing requirement for intervention-either
as a minimum threshold for the interest requirement, or as an addi-
tional implied element of Rule 24.
IV. RULE 24 IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN LITIGATION:
WHY STANDING MUST BE REQUIRED
There are numerous reasons why the federal courts must require
standing for Rule 24 intervention. First and foremost, the policies
that underlie standing are a product of constitutionally-mandated
limitations on the judiciary which preserve our federal system of
government. Additionally, there are prudential considerations within
the requirements of standing that help to limit the size and structure
of any one case to those issues which the federal courts have the au-
thority to resolve. To allow endless numbers of "public policy inter-
venors" to voice their opinions in any case remotely related to their
issue of concern destroys the efficiency the Federal Rules were de-
signed to promote. Finally, the Supreme Court's Diamond v.
Charles5 9 decision has added a due process dilemma to the standing
question, denying intervening parties without standing the ability to
156. 36.96Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 859.
157. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
158. See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1269 (1985) (asserting a less flexi-
ble standard of intervention for public law cases).
159. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
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appeal judgments to which they are bound. Each of these arguments
will be addressed in turn.
A. Rule 24 Absent Standing: A Constitutionally Problematic
Approach to Intervention
The standing doctrine "concerns the subject matter jurisdiction
of the court. ... [and] ensures that a justiciable case or controversy
exists between the parties."' 160 Rule 24(a) intervenors, as dictated by
the rule itself, are representing interests that are not otherwise repre-
sented in the action at the time of their intervention. 161 Therefore,
absent standing, the federal courts are being asked to protect interests
and remedy grievances that would otherwise not be permitted in fed-
eral court due to prudential and constitutional considerations. In es-
sence, intervening parties who lack standing are making end runs
around Article III of the Constitution.
As previously discussed in this Note, 162 in Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton163 the Supreme Court cautioned against allowing lawsuits where
a litigant lacked a direct stake in the controversy because of the need
to "prevent[] the judicial process from becoming no more than a ve-
hicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystand-
ers."' 164 While this case did not involve a party seeking intervention,
the argument for requiring all parties to an action to demonstrate
standing holds true. There is no clear reason why claims which
would be an unconstitutional overreaching of the federal judiciary's
power if heard independently would be proper if brought by an inter-
vening party.
For example, consider again the facts of United States v. 36.96
Acres of Land.165 If the United States had successfully concluded the
condemnation action for the 36.96 acre tract of Crescent Dune and
Save The Dunes Council had then brought suit in federal court, the
160. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 1989).
161. Rule 24(a) allows intervention "when the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action...
unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added).
162. See supra Part II.
163. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
164. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1972) (discussing the rea-
soning behind its Sierra Club v. Morton decision).
165. 754 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 1985).
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second case would be barred for lack of standing. 166 Without a con-
crete interest, the Council would merely be asking the federal courts
to do, for the benefit of all citizens, what Congress would not do leg-
islatively. In so doing, the federal courts would be encroaching on
the powers delegated to the legislative branch if they were to hear the
case. Therefore, their suit could not be heard according to the consti-
tutional separation of powers as enforced against the judiciary by Ar-
ticle III, Section 2.
This scenario raises a number of questions if the same parties
are alternatively allowed to intervene in the matter raising the same
interests. If the Council were granted intervention in the original
lawsuit despite their lack of standing, how is the court's considera-
tion of their grievance now different? If the court designs the out-
come to protect the Council's alleged interests, how is this not a pol-
icy/pseudo-legislative decision, or otherwise an overreaching by the
court? The courts have a clearly defined role in adjudicating con-
demnation proceedings of the United States. However, if a public in-
terest group is permitted to intervene without a legally cognizable in-
terest sufficient to confer standing, what function does that party
serve, other than to urge the court to engage in public policy or legis-
lative decision-making, rather than legal analysis, in rendering an
opinion? The simple answer is that there is no difference. If the fed-
eral courts adjudicate the interests of a party, it is of no consequence
that the party was permitted into the action by intervention rather
than bringing the claim themselves.
Those courts that do not require standing for intervention reason
that once a case or controversy is established, the Article III mandate
is met and there is no longer a constitutional issue or need to require
standing.167 However, this logic is flawed in two respects. First, as
discussed earlier in this Note,' 68 unlike other aspects of justiciability,
the doctrine of standing is not determined by looking at the issues of
the case-whether the case is moot, ripe, or a political question.
166. See id. (having concluded in the first action that the aesthetic, environ-
mental, and personal interest in dunes was insufficient for lack of standing,
Save The Dunes Council would not be permitted to litigate these same interests
in a later suit).
167. See United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir.
1978).
168. See infra Part II.
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Instead, standing focuses on the party and the party's relationship to
the injury alleged.169 In other words, the party's interest in the sub-
ject matter. Therefore, whether or not there is an existing case or
controversy, the constitutional limitations on the kinds of interests
the federal courts can adjudicate still applies. Standing must be de-
termined with respect to each party, not merely as a threshold re-
quirement with respect to each case. The second flaw in this logic is
not so much a constitutional concern, but a matter of prudential and
practical consideration.
B. Prudential and Practical Concerns
In addition to fulfilling the constitutional mandates of Article
III, the standing doctrine assures that prudential limitations will pre-
vent the courts from being overrun by "concerned bystanders"17 at-
tempting to circumvent the political process. As one commentator
discussed, there is a significant difference between the constitutional
standing requirements of Article III and prudential standing require-
ments. 171  While these prudential limitations are judicially con-
structed, rather than constitutionally imposed, 7 2 there is no reason
they should be ignored in the context of intervention.
In the previous section it was noted that courts not requiring
standing to intervene often reason that a case or controversy already
exists and, therefore, party-standing is no longer relevant. 73 The
underlying argument in support of this position is that the judicial
wheels have already been set in motion and, thus, there is little judi-
cial efficiency to be gained by excluding other interests. However,
this argument overlooks the fact that the same prudential and practi-
cal advantages of the standing requirement for parties initiating a
lawsuit would also be advanced by a requirement that all parties to a
suit demonstrate standing. Standing provides prudential limitations a
court may use to bar groups of plaintiffs174 or in essence "to lock
169. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
170. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687.
171. See Ellen J. Bullock, Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why
Standing's Criteria Should Not be Incorporated into Intervention of Right,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 605, 614.
172. See id.
173. See Brennan, 579 F.2d at 190.
174. See Bullock, supra note 171, at 641.
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certain people out of court."' 17 5 This is a helpful tool for judges look-
ing to take an active role in narrowing a case down to the real bare-
bones issues at stake. Especially in public law litigation, cases tend
to get "blown up" to a point where the issues are virtually unman-
ageable and the complexity of the decision becomes worthless for fu-
ture litigants.
Another counterargument put forth by a critic of the standing-to-
intervene requirement argues that standing is too confusing to export
into the Rule 24 context. 176 However, a simple analysis of Rule 24
intervention reveals exactly the same type of inquiry made for Arti-
cle III standing. As another scholar noted, "[t]he question of the
right to intervene is inevitably linked to the question of standing to
initiate the litigation in the first place."' 177 In essence, the standing
doctrine and the interest requirement of Rule 24 each ask the ques-
tion: Does this party have a sufficiently concrete interest either inde-
pendently (for standing) or in the existing matter (for intervention)
such that the federal court has a role in adjudicating their grievance?
If the interest asserted is either a generalized grievance or is not suf-
ficiently framed into an issue the court has the power to resolve, the
court is bound by the strictures of Article III, Section 2 of the Consti-
tution and cannot hear the case. Prudentially speaking, the question
of Rule 24 interest and the question of standing are virtually the
same.
C. The Efficiency Claim
The position that liberalized application of joinder rules will
maximize efficiency 178 may not necessarily be true in the case of in-
tervention. Liberal joinder policies undoubtedly prevent reactive or
duplicitous litigation by allowing all potential future claimants into
the initial dispute. These parties are then bound by any judgment
and cannot relitigate their interest in the dispute in hopes of a more
favorable outcome. However, the efficiency argument breaks down
in the context of public law litigation where many parties do not, and
175. Id. at640.
176. Seeid. at641.
177. See Chayes, supra note 4, at 1290.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir.
1986) (construing Rule 24 broadly in favor of applicant's intervention and
practical considerations).
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will not, have standing to litigate their asserted interests regardless of
the outcome of the decision. For purely public policy interests, the
grievance is too generalized and there is no risk that these parties will
bring a later reactive suit to adjudicate their interests. For purposes
of this analysis, the range of possible intervening parties can be di-
vided into two categories of interests sought to be protected.
1. Potential future claimants
The first group might best be referred to as "Potential Future
Claimants." This category includes parties claiming intervention of
right when their interests are so intertwined with the subject matter
of the action that, as a result of a court's decision, an individual or
group may be adversely affected to such an extent that they might
later have standing to challenge the outcome of the initial action. 
179
These parties represent interests that traditionally would qualify for
intervention under Rule 24 as it was originally drafted, prior to the
1966 amendment.
There is a strong efficiency argument that can be made for not
requiring standing for these types of intervening parties. Because an
unfavorable decision will likely provide the basis for standing, Po-
tential Future Claimants pose the greatest risk of multiplying the
amount of litigation in the federal courts due to reactive claims on
virtually identical issues. However, because standing itself is a
flexible doctrine, 180 it is likely courts could find these Potential Fu-
ture Interest parties have standing based on a concrete risk of future
injury, rendering moot the need for further analysis.
2. Public interest claimants
The second group may appropriately be labeled "Public Interest
Claimants." This group includes those parties invoking Rule 24(a) in
179. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). In this case, a group
of white firefighters originally denied intervention in a discrimination action
between a group of black firefighters and the City of Birmingham were al-
lowed to collaterally attack the consent decree resulting from the first suit. Be-
cause the white firefighters were not parties to the original action, they were
not bound by the consent decree and therefore were not precluded from reliti-
gating the matter. The consent decree from the original action actually pro-
vided the firefighters the requisite standing to bring the second suit.
180. See Tobias, supra note 48, at 427 (discussing the Supreme Court's in-
consistent application of the standing doctrine).
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order to prevent or challenge some public policy or legislative deci-
sion that they would otherwise not have standing to challenge. Envi-
ronmental concerns, 181 abortion rights,
182 and school desegregation' 83
have all motivated Public Interest Claimants to seek intervention.
This second group represents the most problematic aspects in the rise
of public law litigation with respect to the constitutional require-
ments of Article III.
In terms of efficiency, what is most important to recognize about
Public Interest Claimants is that their asserted interest is made no
greater or more concrete by the disposition of the litigation. Unlike
Potential Future Claimants, these parties will not acquire standing by
an unfavorable outcome. For example, environmental activists
claiming a "personal aesthetic, conservational and recreational" 184
interest in an area of national parkland will have no less of a general-
ized grievance if a court grants logging rights in an action in which
they were not allowed to intervene. There is no risk of duplicitous
litigation because these parties do not represent interests which the
federal courts have the power to adjudicate independently. Public
policy interests are just that-interests of public interest or concern.
The Supreme Court has clearly held that the proper method of vindi-
cating such rights is through the democratic process in the legislative
and executive branches, 185 not in the federal courts.
181. See, e.g., Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838
(9th Cir. 1996) (denying intervention to environmental organization in declara-
tory judgment action against Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior).
182. See Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v.
Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998) (denying motion to intervene of
ten state legislators for lack of standing in suit challenging a Missouri statute
prohibiting the use of public funds for abortion related activities); Planned Par-
enthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Cmty. Action, 558 F.2d 861 (8th
Cir. 1977) (granting intervention to local anti-abortion association and local
property owners).
183. See United States v. Georgia, 19 F.3d 1388, 1394 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (up-
holding a district court finding that intervening parties failed to demonstrate a
legally protectable interest; holding that "appellants' only interest in this case
is their political disagreement with the Board, which they should not be al-
lowed to advance as intervenors .... ").
184. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
185. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
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D. The Diamond v. Charles Dilemma
While the Supreme Court has not required standing for initial in-
tervention, it has held that an appeal by an intervening party requires
standing if the original party to the action does not pursue appeals.' 
86
Therefore, the disposition of an action is binding on a Rule 24(a)
party and may not afford an opportunity for appeal. Furthermore,
these parties are subject to res judicata and preclusion of any other
claims related to the action, even if at a later time they are able to
demonstrate standing. This black letter rule declared in Diamond v.
Charles187 raises serious practical and due process concerns for those
parties who are allowed to intervene but lack standing to appeal a fi-
nal judgment.
In Diamond, a group of physicians who provided abortion ser-
vices brought a class action lawsuit against officials responsible for
enforcing Illinois' newly-amended abortion laws under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging a deprivation of their constitutional rights.188 The dis-
trict court granted a temporary restraining order against the enforce-
ment of the new laws.' 89 Dr. Diamond then filed a motion to inter-
vene based on his "conscientious objection to abortions, and on his
status as a pediatrician and as a parent of an unemancipated minor
daughter." 19° Ultimately, a permanent injunction was granted as to
four sections of the Illinois statute and the State did not pursue an
appeal. 191 Dr. Diamond, as the sole appellant, filed a Notice of Ap-
peal with the United States Supreme Court.' 9 2 The Court held that
despite the "sharp and acrimonious" nature of the case as it stood, it
was insufficient by Article III standards due to Dr. Diamond's lack
of standing. 193 The Court recognized the inherent contradiction that
[h]ad the State sought review,.. . Diamond, as an interven-
ing defendant below, also would be entitled to seek review,
186. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) (stating "an inter-
venor's right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side inter-
vention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he
fulfills the requirements of Art. III.").
187. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
188. See id. at 57.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 58.
191. See id. at 61.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 62.
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enabling him to file a brief on the merits .... But this abil-
ity to ride 'piggyback' on the State's undoubted standing
exists only if the State is in fact an appellant .... 194
In other words, Dr. Diamond's interests were outside the scope of the
Court's Article III power, but would somehow be drawn inside that
power if the State were to pursue appeal of its interest, albeit differ-
ent from those of Dr. Diamond.
This confused justification aside, the real dilemma created by
the Diamond case is that it allows for fully-recognized parties to be
bound by a judgment with no avenue to appeal, while other allegedly
co-equal parties have that option. This result would seem to be a
clear violation of due process. An expanded application of Diamond
would also seem to suggest that if original Article III parties settle
out of a dispute after other parties without standing have intervened,
the case is mooted. Although this is not entirely unfair because an
intervenor could not have brought this action alone, their participa-
tion in any suit is therefore lesser. However, intervening parties are
theoretically afforded the right to participate on an equal footing.1
95
Although the common concern is that intervenors might come in
and spoil settlement negotiations, their inability to appeal final judg-
ment lessens their bargaining power in settlement discussions. In es-
sence, because of their inferior bargaining power and the risk of be-
ing bound without appeal, the interests of intervenors may be more
impaired by their participation in a suit than by a judgment in their
absence. This dilemma contradicts the underlying policy of Rule
24-to allow outsiders an opportunity to be heard when their inter-
ests might be impaired or impeded by a judgment in their absence. 1
96
In order to alleviate the practical and constitutional due process
implications of Diamond, as well as the other concerns addressed in
this Note, the Supreme Court should take the next step and declare a
mandatory standing requirement for all parties to an action.
E. The Necessary Defendant Exception
While it is the position of this Note that the federal courts should
adopt a mandatory standing requirement for Rule 24(a) intervenors,
194. Id. at 64.
195. See Bldg. and Constr. Trades Dep't v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
196. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
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it is important to recognize one major caveat to this suggested rule.
The one group that simply should not and, perhaps, cannot be re-
quired to demonstrate standing is defendant intervenors whose inter-
ests are so intertwined in the subject matter of the action that they
would otherwise subject existing parties to multiple or inconsistent
obligations, thereby making them necessary parties to the action.
197
This exception is similar to the argument against standing for Poten-
tial Future Claimants discussed above-in essence, "necessary de-
fendants" are a subsection of that group. 98 Furthermore, because
"[s]tanding is overwhelmingly a plaintiff's hurdle,"1 99 parties seeking
to intervene on the side of the defendant rarely are capable of fram-
ing their asserted interests in such a way as to confer standing to
sue-this follows logically because such parties are not attempting to
sue. Instead, they are merely defending an interest threatened by the
existing action. When an intervening defendant is so situated that the
defendant has not yet suffered an "actual injury" but where an unfa-
vorable outcome in the action would immediately provide this pre-
requisite for standing, it is only logical to either require that person's
presence under Rule 19 or allow their intervention under Rule 24(a).
F. Suggested Remedies for Parties Lacking Standing
It is important to note that, while this Note strongly advocates an
intervention standard that includes standing, a number of alternatives
exist for parties seeking to have their interests legally protected, but
lacking the requisite standing to have the federal courts adjudicate
their grievances. Following is a brief list of suggested remedies.
1) The Democratic Process: As Justice Stewart's dissenting
opinion in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co.20 0 made clear, for generalized grievances involving bad
legislation or public policy, the appropriate remedy is the
197. A necessary party is a person who
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and [who] is so
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence
may .... leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substan-
tial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obli-
gations by reason of the claimed interest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2).
198. See supra Part IV.C. 1.
199. Bullock, supra note 171, at 641.
200. 386 U.S. 129, 156-57 (1967).
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democratic process, not the courts. Therefore, public interest
litigants should direct their resources toward lobbying efforts
and grass roots public awareness-raising rather than clogging
the courts with grievances that are appropriately delegated to
the legislative branch. State and local legislatures are more in
tune with such interests and have greater resources to investi-
gate what, if any, action should be taken.
2) State Law/State Court Remedies: Unlike the federal courts,
state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Therefore, they
may administer advisory opinions or hear claims that would
not meet the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Once again, these authorities
are generally better suited to handle public policy or public in-
terest grievances of the local populations.
3) Amicus Curiae Briefs: Although amicus curiae briefs can-
not raise new issues, they afford an opportunity for outsiders to
an action who have not suffered a concrete injury to weigh-in
or express their interest in the action.20 1 This approach might
be most useful when a judge feels the need for more input on
certain aspects of the case due to the complex nature of the
subject matter, but is disinclined to permit the expansion of the
case by allowing additional parties into the action.
4) Permissive Intervention Rule 24(b):20 2 It has been sug-
gested that permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b) may
be proper in cases where an applicant intervenor does not meet
the requirements of Rule 24(a) intervention of right.20 3 Per-
missive intervention is left to the sole discretion of the court.
20 4
Although this alternative is problematic from this Note's per-
spective because it still defeats the standing mandate of Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution, if combined with some
201. See Bullock, supra note 171, at 640 n.334.
202. Rule 24(b) allows intervention upon timely application "(1) when a
statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when
an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
203. See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that
"[w]hile a public official may not intrude in a purely private controversy, per-
missive intervention is available when sought because an aspect of the public
interest with which he is officially concerned is involved in the litigation.").
204. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
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restrictions (e.g., limited intervention), it may be an effective
way to maintain the integrity of an Article III case while allow-
ing for slightly more liberal intervention.
5) Limited Intervention: The Advisory Committee note to
Rule 24 provides that "[a]n intervention of right under the
amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or re-
strictions responsive among other things to the requirements of
efficient conduct of the proceedings."2 5 This flexibility al-
lows the court to limit participation of intervenors so that they
do not "participate[] on an equal footing with the original par-
ties to a suit''2°6 properly before the court on account of their
standing.20 7 Again, there is an issue whether limited interven-
tion is still allowing an end run around Article III standing, al-
beit to a lesser extent. It is, however, the position of this Note
that granting limited intervention to parties without standing is
highly preferable to allowing their full participation.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the public law litigation explosion--or "lawsuit ma-
nia' 208 --of the last half-century, the federal courts must remain dili-
gent in their efforts to uphold the constitutional requirements of Arti-
cle III. Although the Federal Rules are to be construed in such a
manner as to promote the efficient resolution of disputes, this aim
cannot excuse the courts from adhering to the constitutional limita-
tions which form and define our tripartite system of government. As
one court noted and with whose remarks it seems appropriate to
205. 1966 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE, reprinted in JOHN J. COUND ET AL.,
2000 CIVIL PROCEDURE SUPPLEMENT 77 (2000).
206. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Dep't v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
207. See Vreeland, supra note 5, at 307-09.
208. LOMBROSO, supra note 1.
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conclude, "judicial economy and the Rules of Civil Procedure not-
withstanding, Congress cannot circumvent Article III's limits on the
judicial power."
20 9
Kerry C. White*
209. Mausolfv. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2003. 1 wish to thank the entire Editorial Board
and Staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their diligence and hard
work in making this Issue a reality. I am deeply honored to be part of this re-
markable group. This Note is specially dedicated to my parents for their con-
stant love and support throughout my life and to my brother Matt-my hero,
always.
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